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When the Social Security system was planned, it was
decided that the part which would in the future be most
basic and inclusive should be financed from contributions
of workers and their employers. The size of the benefits
payable to the contributor or his dependents was to bear
some relation to the amount of his earnings which had been
subject to the Social Security tax. The same principles
were later applied to the self-employed. It is under-
standable that American workers and their employers, and
the self-employed, feel a justifiable sense of participation
- and even ownership - in the social insurance system to
which they have contributed. 4 The contributory nature of
the system would certainly seem to impose on Congress
certain moral obligations to the contributors. This moral
obligation (which continues beyond the term of the in-
dividual legislator and even beyond the life of the indi-
vidual contributor) is to devote to the payment of benefits,
by direct expenditure or by investment, the amount of
the contributions. The Nestor decision should make it clear
that this moral obligation does not give to insured per-
sons and their dependents the kind of legal rights which
characterize private contractual insurance. Rather, the par-
ticipants in Social Security must rely on that Court's as-
surance that any changes in their present or potential
benefits must not conflict with the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment and must have the approval of
public opinion which can be reflected at Congressional
elections.
Real Property Held By Tenants By The Entirety
As The 'Subject Of An Advancement
Barron v. Janney'
An aged couple owned a tract of land adjacent to the
family farm as tenants by the entireties. They improved
the tract by remodeling an old school house thereon into
which their daughter, the defendant, moved in 1953. In
1957 the parents jointly conveyed by deed all their interest
"That there is such a sense of ownership can hardly be doubted when,
for example, the recent Congressional and public controversy over health
care for the aged is observed. The proponents of hospitalization benefits
as a part of the social Insurance system very emphatically insist that such
benefits would not be "charity" but rather an earned right.
1225 Md. 228, 170 A. 2d 176 (1961).
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to the defendant.' After the parents died intestate a year
apart, the brother of the defendant filed a bill in equity
seeking to require his sister to elect whether she would
treat the conveyance as an advancement or partition the
tract between herself and the complainant. There was
conflicting testimony in regard to the actual intent of the
father with respect to the conveyance, and no testimony
was introduced as to the intent of the mother. The chan-
cellor found the conveyance to be an advancement. In
reversing, the Maryland Court of Appeals assumed, with-
out deciding, that the doctrine of advancements was still
applicable to real property, but held that the conveyance
to the defendant was not an advancement.
The Court found one of the essential elements of an
advancement to be "that the gift must have been part
of the estate of a donor, which upon his death would de-
scend to his heirs but for the fact that, by his act of making
the gift, it had been separated from or taken out of his
estate."' Since neither parent could have died intestate
seized and possessed of property owned by the entireties,
because, upon the death of either, the whole would remain
in the survivor with the heirs of the first deceased spouse
taking no interest, the Court declared that, in order for
the property to have been an advancement, it would have
had to have been held by moieties and not by entireties.
Since the basic requirement of intestacy with respect to
the property in question was lacking, there could have been
no advancement.
The doctrine of advancements4 is a creature of statute"
and results from the intent of the legislature to provide
for equality among the heirs of the decedent.6 Generally,
an advancement is an irrevocable gift in presenti of money
or property, from an intestate to a descendant, to enable
the donee to anticipate his inheritance to the extent of the
I In 1955 the father informed the defendant in a written note, signed only
by himself, that the remodeled school house was hers. This note alone
could not have formed the basis of an advancement since the father
had no estate he could have given to the defendant due to the survivor-
ship feature of property held by the entireties.
2 Supra, n. 1, 236.
For a general discussion of advancements see Elbert, Advancements: I,
II, III, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 665 (1953); 52 Mich. L. Rev. 231 (1953) ; 52
Mich. L. Rev. 535 (1954).
54 VERNIER, AmERICAN FAMmY LAWS (1936) 114; but see 3 AMmuIcA
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1952) 585 as a possible qualification.6 Dilley v. Love, 61 Md. 603 (1883).
"[Cj)ourts, both in this country and in England, have uniformly
given a liberal construction to such enactments, in order to enforce
the cardinal doctrine which they announce, that in all such cases
equality is equity." (605)
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gift.7 Although there is a great diversity in the treatment
of detail in the various jurisdictions,' in every state but
New Mexico9 there are statutes recognizing the doctrine.
A majority of jurisdictions have enacted statutes concern-
ing advancements which are expressly applicable to both
real and personal property. I" The statutes in the remain-
ing jurisdictions speak in more general terms. The
Indiana," Iowa, 2 and Kansas 3 statutes employ the term
"property." The Georgia Code14 contains the words "either
in money or property," while the Florida advancement
statute 5 provides, "[w]hen any person shall have received
any advancement from an intestate . . . ." However, even
though these general terms are employed, such statutes
have been interpreted so as to encompass both reality and
personalty 6 or the courts have charged both realty and
personalty without any discussion of the problem. 7
7 See the general discussion in the Michigan Law Review, supra, n. 4,
for further refinements of the definition of advancements which is beyond
the scope of this note.
8 ATKINSON, WILLS (2d ed. 1953) 716.
But see Harper v. Harris, 294 F. 44 (8th Cir. 1923) apparently assuming
that the doctrine exists in New Mexico.
1 5 CODE OF ALA. (1958) tit. 16, § 14; 6 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANNO. (1956)
§ 14-211; 5 ARK. STAT. ANNO. (1947) § 61-116; 54 WEST'S ANwNO. CALIF.
PROHATE CODE (1956) § 1051; 6 COLO. REV. STAT. (1953) § 152-2-5; 21
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANNO. (1960) § 45-274; 8 DEL. CODE ANNO. (1953)
tit. 12, § 515; D.C. CODE (1951) § 18-108; 3 IDAHO CODE (1948) § 14-107;
SMITH-HURD ILL. ANNO. STAT. (1961) § 3-15; BALDWIN'S Ky. REV. STAT.
ANNO. (1955) § 391.140; 5 LA. CIVIL CODE (1952) Art. 1227, 1254, 1255,
1283; 4 ME. REV. STAT. (1954) ch. 170, § 4; 6 ANNO. LAWS OF MASS.
(1955) ch. 196, § 3; 23 MICH. STAT. ANNO. (1943) § 27.3178 (157); 31
MINN. STAT. ANNO. (1947) §§ 525.53, 525.531; 1A Miss. CODE ANNO.
(1942) § 475; 26 VERNON'S ANNO. MO. STAT. (1956) § 474.090; 6 REV.
CODE OF MONT. ANNO. (1947) § 91-412; 2A REV. STAT. OF NEB. (1956)
§ 30-112; 2 NEV. COMP. LAWS (Supp. 1942) § 9882.301; 5 N. H. REV.
STAT. ANNO. (1955) §§ 561.13, 561.15, 561.16; N. J. STAT. ANNO. (1953)
§ 3A:4-8; 13 MCKINNEY'S CONSOL. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW OF N. Y. ANNO.
(1949) § 85; 2A GEN. STAT. OF N. C. (1950) § 29-1, Rule 2; 6 N. D.
CENTURY CODE (1960) § 30-21-12; PAGE'S OHIO REV. CODE ANNO. (1954)
§ 2105.05; 2 OKLA. STAT. (1951) tit. 84, § 223; 2 ORE. CoMP. LAWS ANNO.
(1940) § 16-301; 20 PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANNO. (1950) tit. 20, § 1.9; 6 GEN.
LAWS OF R.I. (1956) § 33-1-11; 2 CODE OF LAWS OF S.C. (1952) § 19-56;
3 S. D. CODE (1939) § 56.0114; 6 TENN. CODE ANNO. (1955) § 31.702; 17A
VERNON'S ANNO. TEX. STAT. PROBATE CODE (1956) § 44; 8 UTAH CODE ANNO.
(1953) § 74-4-18; 5 VT. STAT. ANNO. (1958) tit. 14, § 1723; 9 CODE OF
VA. (1950) § 64-17; 3 REMINGTON'S REV. STAT. OF WASH. ANNO. (1932)§ 1348; 1 W. VA. CODE ANNO. (1955) § 4094; 37 WEST'S WIS. STAT. ANNO.
(1958) § 318.24; 3 Wyo. STAT. (1959) § 2-41.
u 3 BURNS' IND. STAT. ANNO. (1953) § 6-210.
12 2 CODE OF IOWA (1958) § 636.44.
GEN. STAT. OF KAN. ANNO. (1949) § 59-510.
1431 CODE OF GA. ANNO. (1959) § 113-1013.
'321 FLA. STAT. ANNO. (Cum. Supp. 1960) § 734.07.
11 West v. Beck, 95 Iowa 520, 64 N.W. 599 (1895).
17 Bowen v. Holland, 184 Ga. 718, 193 S.E. 233 (1937) ; Pylant v. Burns,
153 Ga. 529, 112 S.E. 455 (1922); Klein v. Blackshere, 113 Kan. 539,
215 P. 315 (1923) ; Johnson v. Eaton, 51 Kan. 708, 33 P. 597 (1893).
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In Maryland the descent (or inheritance) statutes' and
distribution statutes 9 are codified under different articles.
This separation has lead to some doubt as to whether the
doctrine of advancements is still applicable to realty ° since
Article 46, Section 31 of the 1911 Maryland Code,2' which
dealt with advancements of real property, along with other
sections of the inheritance statute, was repealed in 1916.2
The reason for abolishing these sections was to more
closely assimilate the rules regulating the descent of realty
with those regulating the distribution of personalty."8 On
this basis, the Maryland Court of Appeals in a recent case,
Kreamer v. Hitchcock,24 stated that "Sections 1 and 2 of
Article 46 [which accomplished the assimilation of the
descent and distribution rules] in practical effect incorpo-
rate by reference the provisions of Article 93 relating to
the distribution of personal property of intestates". It
would, therefore, logically seem to follow that since the
only advancement statute is now contained within Arti-
cle 93 relating to the distribution of personal property of
intestates, it should be applicable to real, as well as per-
sonal property, as the court assumed in the principal case.
Since real property may be the subject of an advance-
ment, does the fact that tenants by the entireties conveyed
the realty to their heir prior to their death prevent the
conveyance from being an advancement? It has been said
that one of the necessary prerequisites of a valid advance-
ment is that the donor must have irrevocably parted with
his title in the subject matter of the advancement, said
title passing to and vesting in the donee.'5 Since an irre-
S4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 46.
i8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93.
'8 M.L.E. (1960) 334, Descent and Distribution, § 53; 2 SYKES, MARY-
LAND PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE (1956) 58.
1 1 MD. CODE (1911) Art. 46, § 31:
"Any child or children of the intestate, or their Issue, having received
from the intestate any real estate by way of advancement may elect
to come into partition with the other parceners on bringing such ad-
vancement ... into hotchpot with the estate descended .. .
MD. LAWS 1916, ch. 325.
=Ibid.
"An act to repeal Sections 1 to 23 (inclusive), 25, 26, 27, 28 and 31
of Article 46 of the Code . . .and to enact in lieu thereof four new
sections . . . ; thereby assimilating the law relating to the real
property of decedents more nearly to the law relating to personal
property."
-207 Md. 454, 462, 115 A. 2d 255 (1955), cited in principal case, p. 234.
' Colley v. Britton. 210 Md. 237, 123 A. 2d 296 (1956) ; Harley v. Harley,
57 Md. 340 (1882); Fennell v. Henry, 70 Ala. 484, 45 Am. Rep. 88
(1881) ; McCellan v. McCauley, 158 Miss. 456, 130 So. 145 (1930) ; Greene
v. Greene, 145 Miss. 87, 110 So. 218, 49 A.L.R. 565 (1926) ; Callender v.
McCreary, 4 How. 356 (Miss. 1840), cited in principal case, p. 236;
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vocable transfer of the donor's title is necessary, courts
have held that the donor must have possessed an alienable
estate in the property at the time of the transfer, and, if
an inalienable estate were purportedly transferred to the
donee, no advancement could have been made.26 Although
at common law the husband, who owned property with his
spouse by the entireties, alone had the power to alienate
same27 and thereby divest his wife of her right of possession
during his lifetime, by the weight of modern authority,
with the inception of Married Women's Acts,28 neither
spouse alone has any specific interest in the property to
convey or encumber so held as long as the tenancy exists,29
notwithstanding some decisions to the contrary.30
Further, and perhaps of greater significance, in order
for a valid advancement to occur, the property which was
transferred to the donee must have been a part of the
donor's estate at the time of the advancement, and, upon
the donor's death, would have descended to his heirs had
the donor died intestate at that time.31 In other words,
the property transferred must have been inheritable upon
the death of the intestate. However, one of the incidents of
a tenancy by the entireties, perhaps the most important,82
is the right of survivorship33 which cannot be defeated by
any act of the co-tenant.34 Since property so held does not
pass by succession upon the death of a tenant by the en-
tireties but rather remains in the living co-tenant by the
incident of survival,8 5 the property is non-inheritable and,
Rickenbacker v. Zimmerman, 10 S.C. 110, 30 Am. Rep. 37 (1878), cited In
principal case, p. 236, Darne's Ex'r v. Lloyd, 82 Va. 859, 5 S.E. 87 (1887).
"McClellan v. McCauley, supra, n. 25; Greene v. Greene, 8upra, n. 25;
Rains v. Hays, 6 Lea. 303, 40 Am. Rep. 89 (Tenn. 1880).
I Cases collected in 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) 232, § 435,
n. 92.
28 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 45. § 1 et seq.
2'Routzahn v. Cromer, 220 Md. 65, 150 A. 2d 912 (1959); Lissau v.
Smith, 215 Md. 538, 138 A. 2d 381 (1958); Columbian Carbon Co. v.
Knight, 207 Md. 203, 114 A. 2d 28 (1955) (Lease executed by the husband
alone on property held by tenants by the entirety held void when made,
but the husband was estopped from claiming Its invalidity after the
divorce of the co-tenants) ; Carlisle v. Parker, 38 Del. 83, 188 A. 67 (1936) ;
Richart v. Roper, 156 Fla. 822, 25 So. 2d 80 (1946) ; Sharp v. Baker, 51
Ind. App. 547, 96 N.E. 627 (1911); O'Malley v. O'Malley, 272 Pa. 528,
116 A. 500 (1922) ; Smith v. Smith, 200 Va. 77, 104 S.E. 2d 17 (1958).
10 King v. Greene, 30 N.J. 395, 153 A. 2d 49 (1959) ; Goodrich v. Village
of Otego, 216 N.Y. 112, 110 N.E. 162 (1915).
"IRickenbacker v. Zimmerman, 10 S.C. 110, 30 Am. Rep. 37 (1878) cited
in principal case, p. 236.
Hutson v. Hutson, 168 Md. 182, 177 A. 177 (1935).
18 Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402, 33 Am. Rep. 266 (1878).
Hutson v. Hutson, supra, n. 32.
Stieff Co. v. Ullrich, 110 Md. 629, 73 A. 874 (1909) ; Marburg v. Cole,
supra, n. 33; Tyler v. U.S., 281 U.S. 497 (1930) (stating Maryland law) ;
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therefore, not subject to the application of the doctrine of
advancements.
However, the principal case does not fall within the
usual advancement situation where property is trans-
ferred to a child by one parent. In the instant case, both
the husband and wife joined in the execution of the deed
to the defendant. Although neither spouse, acting alone,
had the power to convey or encumber any interest in the
property held by the entireties, 6 the co-tenants, acting to-
gether and voluntarily, could validly alienate such prop-
erty. Therefore, the deed executed by both spouses which
named defendant as the grantee transferred an alienable
estate.
The Court of Appeals, however, based its decision upon
the absence of the prerequisite of inheritability in the in-
stant case. While this factor is lacking in any case where
parties hold property by the entireties, and the Court was
correct in its application of the theoretical aspect of the
law, ancient technicalities should not be employed to bind
all future decisions in this area of advancements. The
Court, in the proper case, should find an advancement, if
the policy prerequisites for an advancement are other-
wise present,38 notwithstanding the fact that property was
held by the entireties and therefore not technically in-
heritable. Where the intent to make an advancement is
clear on the part of both spouses, this intent should be
given effect. If not, the policy of the legislature to provide
for equality of distribution among the heirs of the in-
testate will be defeated.
DANIEL F. THOMAS
Deliberation And Premeditation In First Degree Murder
Cummings v. State'
An intimate, clandestine relationship had developed
between defendant and decedent, and they often took long
automobile trips together. On July 28, 1960, the decedent
drove from Chicago with her sister to the home of rela-
Hunt v. Covington, 145 Fla. 706, 200 So. 76 (1941); Sloan v. Jones, 192
Tenn. 400, 241 S.W. 2d 506, 25 A.L.R. 1235 (1951); also see 2 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 430.
Supra, n. 29.
8 Tizer v. Tizer, 162 Md. 489, 160 A. 163 (1932); also see 2 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 436.
See Elbert, op. cit. 8upra, n. 4.
1223 Md. 606, 165 A. 2d 886 (1960).
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